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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

THE LAW-BUSINESS OR PROFESSION?
ILLINOIS DECISIONS

A REVIEW OF

JOHN R. SNIVELY*
In an opinion which was handed down by the Supreme Court of Illinois
on the 22nd day of last December, the Motorists' Association of Illinois was
found guilty of contempt of court for practicing law. A fine of $1,000 and
costs was imposed. Subsequent thereto, the respondent filed a petition for
rehearing which was denied on the 8th day of February.
This was an original proceeding in the Supreme Court by information in
the name of the People on the relation of the Chicago Bar Association. The
relator sought to have the respondent punished for contempt of court for
practicing law and also to enjoin it from continuing such practice. Leave to
file the information was granted and it was filed at the February term 1933.
An answer was filed by the respondent at the April term. Thereupon. the
relator moved to make the rule absolute on the answer, to assess a penalty
and to enjoin the respondent from continuing the practice of law. It was
thereupon ordered that the motion be treated as a demurrer to the answer and
the parties were directed to file briefs. A brief was filed by the relator but the
respondent filed none.
The respondent was organized on December 16. 1925 under the laws of
this state as a corporation not for profit. Since then it has maintained and
operated a motor club and its business has covered a large portion of the
state. It has had approximately fifty thousand members. The nature and
extent of the services furnished to its members were disclosed and admitted
by the respondent but it denied that it was engaged in the practice of law.
It appears from the record that the respondent advertised that it maintained a legal department for the use of its members, that it maintained a
legal department, and that it employed several attorneys who rendered legal
services to the members of the Association. These services included the
*Member, Rockford, Illinois Bar, Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law. American Bar Association. Member 1927-1930, Chairman 1930-1933, Committee on Unlawful Prac-

tice of the Law, Illinois State Bar Association.
[Editor's note: Childs v. Smeltzer, 314 Pa.
171 AtI. 883, (1934), contains an interesting and instructive interpretation of the latest Pennsylvania statute on the unauthorized

practice of the law, the Act of Apr. 24, 1933, P. L. 66, (17 P. S. Sec. 1608).

This case holds

that habitual drafting for hire of legal instruments constitutes the practice of law, citing People

v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N. E. 901.
broker to draft conveyances, etc., is discussed also.]

The right of a real estate
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giving of legal advice, the handling of damage claims, the appearance at inquests, and representation in Police and Justice Courts.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren H. Orr delivered the opinion of the court. In
the opinion it was said:
"It requires no discussion to demonstrate that the services so rendered by
respondent for its members, through the attorneys employed by respondent, are legal services. (People v. Peoples Stock Yards State Bank, 344
ill. 462, 176 N. E. 901). Although respondent denies that its conduct
constituted the practice of the law, its principal contention is that it is entitled to practice law by virtue of the fact that it is a corporation organized 'not for profit' and that it is therefore not prohibited from practicing
law. In support of this contention it relies upon 'An act to prohibit
corporations from practicing law, directly or indirectly, making the same
a misdemeanor and providing penalties for the violation thereof.'
(Cahill's Stat. 1933, chap. 32, pars. 224-228), Section 1 of the act prohibits corporations from practicing law. Section 5 provides that the act
shall not apply to 'corporations organized not for pecuniary profit.' The
same section, however, also provides as follows: 'But no corporation
shall be permitted to render any services which cannot lawfully be rendered by a person not admitted to practice law in this State nor to solicit
directly or indirectly professional employment for a lawyer.'
"In People v. Peoples Stock Yards State Bank, supra, we recognized that
it was within the power of the legislature to pass an act prohibiting corporations from practicing law and to provide a penalty for violations of
the act, but we also indicated that the legislature had no authority to
license or permit a person to practice law in this State, and that such an
act would be invalid if it sought in any way to tie the hands of this court
in determining who should be permitted to practice law and in punishing
those who engage in such practice without the permission of this court.
(In re Day, 181 I1. 73). In People v. Association o1 Real Estate Taxpayers of Illinois, 354 1ll, 102, 187 N. E. 823, following the well settled
rule, we held that a corporation cannot be licensed to practice law, and
that this rule applies to corporations organized not for profit.
"There can be no question from the record but that respondent wrongfully
engaged in the practice of law for several years. It claims to have discontinued such practice on March 1, 1933, after this court had granted
leave to file the present information against it. While such cessation
might afford a basis for refusal of an iniunction against a recurrence of
similar wrongful acts, it cannot, under the circumstances of this case, be
considered in mitigation of the offense. Since our decision in People v.
Peoples Stock Yards State Bank, supra, it has been clear that such acts
as those of respondent constitute the practice of law. In the face of that
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decision respondent has continued in its wrongful conduct, in utter disregard of the authority of this court."
This is the third contempt proceeding that has been decided by the
Supreme Court of this state and in each case a substantial penalty was imiposed.
It was established in People v. Peoples Stock Yards State Bank, supra,
which was decided June 18, 1931, that the Supreme Court has inherent power
to punish for contempt any corporation or unauthorized person who presumes
to practice law. In addition, the wrongful act constitutes a contempt of the
trial court as well as the Supreme Court.
Leave to file the information was granted and it was filed at the April
term 1928. An answer was filed by the respondent at the June term. The
cause was then referred to a commissioner to take the evidence and report
his conclusions of fact and law. In his report which was filed at the October
term the commissioner recommended that relief be granted as prayed in the
information. The respondent filed objections to the report, which were overruled, and by stipulation of the parties it was agreed that the objections should
stand as exceptions in the Supreme Court. After the filing of the report,
briefs were filed on behalf of both parties. Several briefs as arnicus curiae
were also filed.
It appears from the record that the respondent. through its salaried attorneys, conducted foreclosure proceedings. handled the administration of
estates, prepared and attended to the execution of wills for its customers, examined abstracts of title and rendered opinions thereon, handled real estate
transactions including the preparation and execution of affidavits to clear up
defects in the title, releases, deeds and mortgages. and prepared contracts,
leases, deeds containing covenants to stand seized to the use of the grantor
and many other legal instruments. In addition, it furnished the legal advice
necessary to the performance of these services, and appropriated to its own
use the fees charged and collected for such services and advice.
In the opinion, which was also written by Mr. Chief Justice Orr, it was
said :
"Where the rendering of such services involves the use of legal knowledge or skill, or where legal advice is required and is availed of or
rendered in connection with such transactions, this is sufficient to characterize the services as practicing law."
In view of the fact that this was the first time that the court had been
called upon to decide the questions involved, a fine of $1,000 and costs was
imposed. This case is considered the most outstanding case on this subject
that has ever been reviewed.
In the recent case of People v,Association of Real Estate Tax-payers of
Illinois, supra, which was decided October 21, 1933, rehearing denied Decem-
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her 7. 1933, the respondent was also found guilty of contempt of court for
practicing law. In this case a fine of $2,500 and costs was imposed.
Leave to file the information was granted and it was filed at the October
term 1932. An answer was filed by the respondent the following month.
Thereafter, the cause was referred to a commissioner to take the evidence
and report his conclusions of fact and law. In his report the commissioner
recommended that the relief prayed for be denied and found that the respondent
had not engaged in the practice of law. Five objections were filed by the
relator to the report of the commissioner and were by him overruled, which
objections were ordered to stand as exceptions in the Supreme Court. After
the filing of the report, briefs were filed on behalf of both parties.
The Association was organized on May 9, 1930 under the laws of this
state as a corporation not for profit. It employed several attorneys who instituted various legal proceedings in the courts of Cook County on behalf of
its members. Three cases were appealed to the Supreme Court of this state.
Application was also made to have the Supreme Court of the United States
review one of them. However, the petition for certiorari was denied. Over
$150,000.00 of the fees which were collected from the members of the association were used for attorneys fees and court costs.
It appears from the record that the Association advised its members not
to pay any portion of the 1930 taxes until the courts of last resort has passed
on the validity of the same. Similar advice was given over the radio. A tax
strike resulted leaving approximately $300,000,000.00 in unpaid taxes. Of
this amount $20,000,000.00 was owed by the 28,000 members of the Association.
The payment of taxes is essential to the existence and operation of the
government. A refusal to pay all legal taxes that have been levied deprives
the government of the revenue that is necessary to its continuance and causes
serious damage. The activities of this Association were flagrant, pernicious
and injurious to the public interest.
It is indeed apparent that the sole inducement to corporations and laymen to do law business is the compensation derived therefrom. Such unauthorized practices would largely cease however, if it were not for the participation therein by members of the bar. This situation is the fault of the
profession itself in allowing its members to accept employment to further such
practices. It is in the public interest that we protect the public from the evil
effects thereof. This responsibility is our own.
The time has arrived when we must face the issue squarely. This problem will never be entirely solved by the institution of proceedings against the
corporations and laymen who persist in such practices. It is well settled that
any member of the bar who assists a corporation in the same is subject to
discipline by the Supreme Court. He may even be deprived of his right to
practice.
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It is imperative that we purge the profession of the members who have
been so willing to participate in such practices. In this way we will strike at
the principal participant in lay encroachments and will maintain the independence and integrity of the profession. Such practices will then largely cease
and we will have rendered a great service to the public and the profession.
The law has always been a profession. It is in the public interest that
it be so continued. The independence and integrity of the profession is in the
balance and action must not be delayed.

